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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the transparency of politics
and the quality of politicians in a model of parties’ political recruitment. We ﬁnd
that an increase in the transparency of politics reduces the average quality of
the politicians a party recruits in equilibrium. (JEL: D72, J44, J45; Keywords:
Transparency, politicians, parties, political recruitment.)
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Politics has always attracted the attention of the media, citizens organizations, and the
general public. Recent years have also witnessed a global process of “spectacularization”
of politics, which among other things has resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of
information available about many facets of political life.
Politicians, for example, are literally public ﬁg u r e s ,a n dm u c ho fw h a tt h e yd oi sn o wt h e
object of close public scrutiny. Nevertheless, the extent to which various aspects of what
goes on within the political sector are observable from the outside, which we refer to as the
transparency of politics, still varies a great deal across countries. For example, while in some
countries all individual votes in the legislature are part of the public record (e.g., U.S. and
Sweden), this is not the case in others (e.g., Italy and Spain). Also, while many democracies
have adopted disclosure laws that require political parties and politicians to report all the
contributions they receive (e.g., Canada and U.K.), such laws are not in place in several
other countries (e.g., Austria and Finland).
It is therefore interesting to ask whether the transparency of politics may be systemati-
cally related to political outcomes, and whether more transparency would necessarily lead to
better outcomes. In particular, in this article we analyze the relationship between the trans-
parency of politics and the quality of politicians, and focus on the recruitment of politicians
by political parties.
Parties represent a fundamental institution of representative democracy, and are the
political-sector analogues of ﬁrms in the market sector. By and large, politicians are aﬃliated
with a party, and typically start their political careers by working for party organizations
1(see, e.g., Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta (2000)). Hence, the recruiting decisions of
parties determine the quality of the pool of politicians.
As in Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo (2006), we model the situation faced by a
political party who has to recruit new politicians. Potential recruits are heterogeneous with
respect to their political skills, and may either work for the party and become professional
politicians, or ﬁnd alternative employment in the market sector. Political skills are valuable
in the political sector and are observable by the party. In fact, people who are potentially
interested in becoming politicians typically begin their involvement in politics by engaging in
a variety of unpaid political activities that are organized and monitored by political parties
(e.g., student political organizations, campaign teams, party internships). These activities
provide opportunities for a political party to observe the quality of individuals it may be
potentially interested in recruiting.
Political skills are also valuable in the market sector. They may be directly productive
in certain occupations, like for example working for lobbying ﬁrms (see, e.g., Mattozzi and
Merlo (2006)), or indirectly valuable because they are positively correlated with other skills
that are directly productive in other occupations (see, e.g., Mattozzi and Merlo (2005)). As
long as politics is not perfectly transparent, however, the political skills of individuals are
only imperfectly observable by potential employers outside of the political sector, although
the party’s recruiting decisions also convey some information about the quality of its recruits.
The beneﬁt to the political party from recruiting a new politician, which, for example,
may be measured by the funds raised by the politician on behalf of the party, increases with
the political skills of the recruit. The objective of the party when making its recruiting
2decisions is to generate rents, given by the diﬀerence between the funds raised by its recruits
and the wages it has to pay them. Hence, each politician has to raise at least enough funds
to cover his salary, which is determined in equilibrium by his outside option of working in
the perfectly competitive market sector, where individuals are paid based on their expected
political skills. In particular, the potential market wage of a party’s recruit is equal to a
weighted average of the individual’s political skills and the average skills of politicians within
the party, where the weight measures the transparency of politics.
We characterize the party’s equilibrium recruiting rule, which determines the endogenous
quality of the party’s membership, and evaluate the eﬀect of transparency on the quality
of politicians. We ﬁnd that an increase in the transparency of politics reduces the average
quality of the politicians a party recruits in equilibrium.
To understand this result, it is useful to analyze the eﬀect of a reduction in transparency,
starting from the situation where politics is perfectly transparent, so that political skills are
directly observable both within and outside the political sector. In this case, the wages of
all potential recruits (regardless of whether they become politicians or work in the market
sector), are solely determined by their individual political skills, and suppose that the market
wages of the most skilled individuals exceed the amount of funds they could raise for the party,
so that the party would not recruit them as politicians. Consider now the situation where
politics is not perfectly transparent, so that political skills are only imperfectly observable
from outside the political sector. In this case, the party’s equilibrium recruiting strategy
conveys some information to the market sector about the skills of the party’s recruits. This
information externality aﬀe c t st h ee q u i l i b r i u mw a g et h ep a r t yh a st op a yt oe a c ho fi t s
3recruits, which is equal to a weighted average between the recruit’s political skills and the
average skills of all of the party’s recruits. This implies that as long as the party recruits
individuals from a range of political skills, it can now aﬀord to recruit relatively better
politicians, since their market wages are now lower than in the case where politics is perfectly
transparent. At the same time, the market wages of individuals with relatively low political
skills are now higher, thus making it not worthwhile for the party to recruit individuals at
the bottom of the distribution of political skills, who may now be too expensive compared
to the relatively low beneﬁts they generate for the party. Overall, this results in an increase
in the average quality of politicians, which is larger the larger the information advantage the
party has over the market sector (i.e., the less transparent politics is).
II. Related Literature
This paper borrows heavily from our work on the careers of politicians and political recruit-
ment contained in Mattozzi and Merlo (2005, 2006), where we develop the basic framework
and some of the concepts that are used here. Our previous work, however, does not address
the relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians, which is
the focus of this paper.
Our work also relates to the literature on the role of parties in the selection of electoral
candidates (see, e.g., Caillaud and Tirole (2002), Carrillo and Mariotti (2001), and Snyder
and Ting (2002)), and, more generally, on the endogenous selection of politicians (see, e.g.,
Besley and Coate (1997), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), and
Osborne and Slivinski (1996)). The focus of this literature, however, is quite diﬀerent form
4the objective of our paper (see, e.g., Merlo (2006) for a survey).
Finally, there is a recent related literature that studies the eﬀects of transparency in
a variety of political institutions, like for example elections, committees, legislatures, and
bureaucracies (see, e.g., Ernesto Dal Bo (2006), Alessandro Gavazza and Alessandro Lizzeri
(2006), Gilat Levy (forthcoming), Andrea Prat (2005), and the other articles included in this
symposium of the American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings). Like the results
in our paper, this literature ﬁnds that increasing transparency does not necessarily lead to
better outcomes.
III. Model and Results
We consider a situation where a political party, which is deﬁned as a collection of politicians,
has to recruit new members. Recruitment opportunities arrive randomly, and when an
opportunity materializes the party has to decide whether or not to pursue it. The party
can recruit as many politicians as it likes (i.e., adding a new member does not preclude
the possibility of recruiting additional members). Hence, each recruiting decision can be
analyzed independently.
There exists a set of individuals of measure one who are potentially interested in becom-
ing politicians. Their alternative is to work in the (perfectly competitive) market sector.
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their political skills p, which are uniformly
distributed on [0,1], and are valuable in the political sector as well as in the market sector.
Each individual knows his own skills, which are also perfectly observable by the party, but
not by the market sector.
5If an individual with political skills p ∈ [0,1] joins the party, he raises an amount of
funds for the party equal to y(p)=γpα,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1),a n dγ ∈ (0,1/2]. Hence, the fund-
raising technology y(p) is described by a standard production function, which is increasing
and concave. If the party recruits the individual, the party’s payoﬀ is equal to y(p)−wP(p),
where wP(p) is the (endogenous) wage the party pays to the individual. If, on the other
hand, the party does not recruit him, the party’s payoﬀ generated by the lost recruiting
opportunity is equal to 0.
The political skills of individuals are only imperfectly observable outside of the political
sector. However, since they are known by the party, potential employers in the market
sector can use the party’s recruiting strategy to form beliefs about the expected skills of the
party’s recruits. To capture these aspects of the environment we are considering, we specify
that the potential market wage of a party’s recruit is equal to his expected political skills
(based on the information available to the market sector), and is given by a weighted average
of the recruit’s own political skills and the average skills of a generic party’s recruit. The
parameter µ ∈ [0,1], which is the weight associated with an individual’s own skills, denotes
the transparency of politics, where µ =0corresponds to a situation where the market sector
can only observe whether an individual is being recruited by the party, but has no additional
information about potential recruits, and µ =1corresponds to the opposite extreme of
complete transparency, where political skills are directly observable by the market sector.
While this speciﬁcation is clearly a reduced form, it can be derived from a more elaborate
model of the market sector.
We are interested in characterizing the equilibrium recruiting strategy of the party, and
6hence the political skills of individuals who enter the political sector. More speciﬁcally, let
P ⊆ [0,1] be a ﬁnite union of non-degenerate intervals. A party structure P is an equilibrium
if and only if the following two conditions are satisﬁed for all p ∈ P:( i )y(p) − wP(p) ≥ 0;
and (ii) wP(p) ≥ µp+(1− µ)EM [P],w h e r eEM [P] denotes the expected skills of a generic
party member from the point of view of the market sector, conditional on the party structure
being P. Condition (i) requires that each member of the party raises at least enough funds
for the party to pay for his own wage, and condition (ii) implies that no prospective politician
prefers to work in the market sector.
Suppose the party has the opportunity to recruit a generic individual with political skills
p. Will the party pursue this opportunity? To answer this question, recall that the expected
wage in the market sector of an individual with skills p that is recruited by the party is equal
to µp +( 1− µ)EM [P]. It follows that the party will recruit the individual if and only if
y(p)−wP (p) ≥ 0,w h e r ewP (p)=µp+(1− µ)EM [P].C o n c a v i t yo fy(p) implies that it is
never proﬁtable for the party to recruit individuals with skills belonging to disjoint intervals.
Therefore the party will be willing to recruit any individual with political skills belonging
to an interval, as long as the party’s rents generated by recruiting the individual are non
negative. Hence, P =[ pL,p H] ⊆ [0,1],w h e r epL <p H.
Moreover, if γ<(1 + µ)/2, the political party will never recruit the best possible politi-









Hence, for γ ∈ (0,1/2],w eh a v et h a tpH < 1.
We conclude that an equilibrium party structure P =[ pL,p H] ⊂ [0,1] where pL <p H < 1













The following proposition provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence
and uniqueness of a solution to the system (1) above, which characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1: An equilibrium party structure P =[ pL,p H] ⊂ [0,1], pL <p H < 1, exists
and is unique if and only if α<µ .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :By solving the ﬁrst equation of system (1) in pH we get
pH (pL)=
2γpα
L − (1 + µ)pL
(1 − µ)
,
where pH (pL) is a strictly concave function such that pH (0) = 0 and pH (pL) >p L if and
only if pL < e p ≡ γ
1




α (1 − µ) − γpα
L (1 + µ)+2 µpL
1 − µ
=0 .
Note that system (1) has always two coincident solutions, namely pL = pH (pL)=0and
pL = pH (pL)=e p.M o r e o v e r ,
lim
pL→0S








(µ − α) ≥ 0
if and only if µ ≥ α. Therefore, when µ>α , system (1) always admits a solution.
In order to show that µ>αis also a necessary condition for existence, ﬁrst notice that
when α = µ system (1) admits only coincident solutions. Suppose now that µ<α .B y






µpL +( 1− µ)
pH+pL
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that can be rewritten as
x
−α =
1+µ +( 1− µ)x
1 − µ +( 1+µ)x
,
where x ≡ pH/pL > 1.D e ﬁne
G(x) ≡ x
−α −
1+µ +( 1− µ)x
1 − µ +( 1+µ)x
,












0 (x)=−α + µ<0.
T h e r e f o r ei tc a n n o tb et h a tG0 (x) < 0 in all equilibria. However, if we evaluate G0 (x) in
equilibrium we have that
G
0 (x)=
4µx − α((1 − µ2)(1+x2)+2( 1+µ2)x)





4µx − µ((1 − µ2)(1+x2)+2( 1+µ2)x)
x(1 − µ +( 1+µ)x)
2 = −
µ(1 − µ2)(1− x)
2
x(1 − µ +( 1+µ)x)
2 < 0.
In order to show that the solution of system (1) is unique, ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti ft h e r ea r e
multiple solutions, the limits of S (pL) computed above imply that the number of solutions
9must be generically odd. In particular, if there are three solutions 0 <p 0
L <p 00
L <p 000
L < e p,
then it must be the case that S0 (p0
L) < 0, S0 (p00
L) > 0,a n dS0 (p000
L) < 0. By evaluating S0 (pL)
in equilibrium and rearranging terms, we have that S0 (pL) < 0 if and only if
γp
α−1












Since the sign of the expression above depends only on the term in square brackets, if this
term is monotone in pL the solution must be unique. By taking the derivative with respect
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− (1 + µ) >
µ
α
− 1 > 0,
since, in equilibrium, concavity of y(p) implies that γαp
α−1
L >µ>γ α p
α−1
H . ¥
Note that in equilibrium the party only recruits mediocre politicians: it does not pursue
either the very best or the worst political talent potentially available. This result also arises
in the model we study in Mattozzi and Merlo (2006). However, in that model, the result is
due to an equilibrium eﬀect that forces the party to forego the opportunity of recruiting the
very best politicians, in spite of the fact that in principle the party could aﬀord to recruit
individuals of all skill levels, including the very best. On the other hand, in the environment
we consider here, the result is a direct consequence of the assumption that the party can
never aﬀord to recruit individuals with the highest level of political skills (which is the case
if γ ≤ 1/2). In equilibrium, the party is not willing to recruit individuals with either very
10low or very high political skills since they do not generate enough rents relative to the wages
t h ep a r t yh a st op a yt h e m .
The next proposition establishes the comparative statics property of the unique equilib-
rium.
Proposition 2: An increase in the transparency of politics (i.e., an increase in µ)r e d u c e s
the average quality of politicians.
Proof of Proposition 2: The result follows from applying the Implicit Function The-



















































and, from the proof of Proposition 1, S0 (pL) < 0. ¥
IV. Conclusions
Our results suggest that enhancing the transparency of politics may not be necessarily a
desirable thing to do. In particular, our analysis has pointed out a particular mechanism
that may generate a perverse relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality
11of politicians. In future work, we plan to address empirically the relationship between the
transparency of various aspects of political systems and the characteristics of the political
class and their performance in oﬃce.
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